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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Mark D. Beavers appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition for postconviction relief.

On appeal, he raises three issues:

(1) the district court erred when it

summarily dismissed, without a twenty-day notice period, his claim that the prosecution withheld
favorable information; (2) the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to
amend the post-conviction petition; and (3) the district court erred when it dismissed, after an
evidentiary hearing, his claim that one of his trial attorneys was ineffective for failing to retain an
expert witness on the probability of whether the investigating officer in the underlying criminal
case was able to detect the smell of marijuana coming from Mr. Beavers’ property.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The case underlying Mr. Beavers’ petition for post-conviction relief is Kootenai County
No. CR 2006-18813 (hereinafter, the criminal case), involving charges of trafficking in
marijuana and possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. (See R., pp.419-31.)
The Idaho Court of Appeals, in State v. Beavers, 152 Idaho 180, 181 (Ct. App. 2010), rev. denied
(Apr. 19, 2011), described the background of the criminal case as follows: “After receiving
reports of a strong odor of marijuana emanating from Beavers’ home, police obtained a search
warrant. During the search of Beavers’ home, police discovered forty-five growing marijuana
plants, jars containing marijuana, and literature on growing marijuana. Police also discovered
scales, bags, and paraphernalia.” (See R., pp.696-67.)1

1

All citations to “R.” refer to the 1935-page Clerk’s Record on Appeal. The record is divided
into two parts: the 418-page Clerk’s Record on Appeal (pages 1 to 418), and the 1517-page
Supplemental Record (pages 419 to 1935). Please note the record is not in chronological order.
1

Following his arrest, Mr. Beavers filed a motion for a Franks hearing2 and a motion to
suppress, asserting the statements by the investigating officer, Detective Paull of the Coeur
d’Alene Police Department, were made with reckless disregard for the truth, and without such
facts there would not have been a finding of probable cause by the magistrate. (R., pp.879-92;
see R., pp.659-60.) As the district court here explained, the magistrate in the criminal case
“relied on Detective Paull’s claims in order to issue a search warrant.” (R., p.1762.) Detective
Paull’s testimony in support of the issuance of the search warrant included testimony that
Mr. Beavers’ power usage was unusual, and that the officer had smelled the odor of marijuana
coming from Mr. Beavers’ property. (See R., pp.660-61.) The district court observed, “[a]s a
result of the search, approximately 45 marijuana plants were located in greenhouses in the
Petitioner’s back yard,” leading to the charges against Mr. Beavers. (R., p.1762.)
After Mr. Beavers filed the motion to suppress in the criminal case,3 the district court in
the criminal case (hereinafter, the trial court), “determined that Beavers had met his burden of
showing that it was probable that Officer Paull’s oral affidavit was false and/or made in reckless
disregard sufficient to allow for a Franks hearing.” (See R., p.1763.) The trial court conducted a
Franks hearing where Detective Paull and a forensic scientist expert witness testified for the
State, but Mr. Beavers did not call any witnesses. (See R., pp.661-62.)
According to the district court, the trial court “determined that Paull made certain
statements regarding Beavers’ power usage over the past five years which were false and
reflected a reckless disregard for truth and accuracy.” (R., p.1763; see R., p.666.) However, the
trial court “determined that the magistrate judge correctly concluded there was probable cause to

2

See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
2

issue the search warrant based upon several other factors, including Paull’s testimony regarding
the odor of marijuana, the neighbor’s detection of the odor of marijuana, a DEA informant’s tip,
and other evidence of the totality of the circumstances.” (R., p.1763; see R., pp.667-70.) The
trial court found Mr. Beavers did not show by a preponderance of the evidence that
Detective Paull’s testimony that he smelled the odor of marijuana was false. (R., p.1763; see
R., p.668.)

The trial court also “noted that the Defendant did not call any witnesses.”

(R., p.1763; see R., p.667 n.1.) The trial court determined the magistrate did not abuse his
discretion in finding probable cause, and the search warrant was valid. (R., p.670.) Thus, the
trial court denied Mr. Beavers’ motion to suppress. (R., pp.670, 673.)
At the end of Mr. Beavers’ trial, the jury convicted him of trafficking in marijuana and
possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver. (See R., p.697.) Mr. Beavers
appealed, and the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the trial court.

(See

R., pp.696-709.)
In April 2012, Mr. Beavers filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.41931; see R., p.1759.) As one ground for relief, Mr. Beavers asserted, “[t]he prosecutor withheld
information favorable to the defendant.” (R., pp.422-23.) He also raised numerous claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel against his three trial attorneys from the criminal case, as well
as three claims of error by the district court. (See R., pp.421-23.) One of the ineffective
assistance of counsel claims was that Mr. Beavers’ second trial attorney (hereinafter, trial
counsel), who represented him at the Franks hearing, was ineffective for failing “to retain an

3

The district court took judicial notice of the criminal case. (R., p.1763 n.3.) Mr. Beavers had
requested the district court take judicial notice of the trial court’s memorandum decision on the
motion to suppress. (R., pp.658-74.)
3

expert witness to testify on technical issues regarding the probability of smelling marijuana
under the conditions that existed at the time of Det. Paull’s claim.” (See R., p.426.)
The State filed an answer, containing a general denial of the allegations in the petition.
(R., pp.540-41.) The State also filed two motions for summary dismissal. (R., pp.689, 724-25.)
The State’s two briefs in support of summary dismissal did not specifically address the
withholding favorable information claim. 4 (See R., pp.690-94, 726-33.) But in its order on
summary dismissal, the district court dismissed the withholding favorable information claim
because “the Petitioner provided no evidence supporting his allegation that the prosecutor
withheld evidence favorable to the defendant.” (See R., p.1770 n.14.)
The State filed the second motion for summary dismissal in October 2013. (R., p.724.)
Appointed post-conviction counsel for Mr. Beavers had withdrawn in between the filings of the
first and second motions for summary dismissal. (See R., pp.711-13.) Before the State filed the
second motion for summary dismissal, the district court denied Mr. Beavers’ renewed motion for
the appointment of counsel. 5 (See R., pp.715-23.)
By the end of August 2014, the district court had postponed the deadline for Mr. Beavers
to file a response to the motion for summary dismissal multiple times, to October 8, 2014. (See
R., pp.734-35, 1072-73, 1122-23, 1510-11.) The district court scheduled a telephonic oral
argument on the motion for summary dismissal for November 19, 2014. (R., p.1510.)
On September 2, 2014, Mr. Beavers filed a motion to amend the petition for postconviction relief.

(R., pp.1515-40.)

Mr. Beavers sought to include additional claims of

4

In his response to the States’ motion for summary dismissal, Mr. Beavers asserted the
withholding favorable information claim should not be dismissed. (See R., pp.1746-47.)
5
Two other post-conviction attorneys had also withdrawn from Mr. Beavers’ case, and the
district court determined, “there is no showing of good cause to assign a fourth attorney to
represent the Petitioner on his post-conviction claims.” (See R., pp.716-17, 721.)
4

ineffective assistance of counsel against trial counsel. (See R., pp.1517-20.) The State did not
file with the district court an opposition to the motion to amend.6 (See R., p.1643 n.1.)
In an October 9, 2014 order, the district court denied the motion to amend. (R., pp.164348.) The district court noted that, “argument on the State’s motion for summary disposition has
been set and rescheduled four times. The matter has been rescheduled to accommodate motions
to disqualify judges, motions for discovery, and motions for reconsideration.”

(R., p.1644

(footnotes omitted).) The district court found “that the State will be unduly prejudiced if the
motion were granted due to the late nature of the request and the short timeframe before
argument is scheduled. Therefore, the motion is denied.” (R., pp.1645-46.)
The same day,7 the district court granted another motion for an extension of time filed by
Mr. Beavers, rescheduling the due date for his response to the motion for summary dismissal to
October 29, 2014. (R., pp.1640-42.) Mr. Beavers had asserted he was unable to meet the
deadline to file a brief in response to the State’s motion for summary dismissal, until the district
court ruled on the motion to amend and his other pending motions. (See R., pp.1635-39.) The
district court kept the oral argument set for November 19, 2014. (R., p.1641.) However, on that
date the district court postponed the deadline for the response to December 22, 2014, and
telephonic oral argument to January 7, 2015. (R., pp.1703-04.)
Mr. Beavers then filed his response to the State’s motion for summary dismissal.
(R., pp.1705-50.) In the response, Mr. Beavers asserted, “[t]he failure of [trial counsel] to obtain
and utilize expert testimony at the suppression hearing regarding the odor of growing marijuana
constitutes deficient performance. The affidavit of Toxicologist Elliot Briggs, dated January 26,

6

Mr. Beavers filed a Reply to Respondents’ Opposition to Motion to Amend. (R., pp.1602-15.)
5

2007, establishes prejudice.”

(R., p.1728 (citation omitted); see R., pp.893-95 (unsigned

affidavit).)
The district court issued its order on the motion for summary dismissal in late January
2015, dismissing all but one of Mr. Beavers’ post-conviction claims. (R., pp.1758-71.) The
district court determined, “[a]n evidentiary hearing will [be] held to determine whether the
Petitioner has established his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to” whether
trial counsel “provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to retain/present an expert
witness to testify regarding the probability of smelling marijuana under the conditions that
existed at the time of Detective Paull’s claim he could smell an odor of marijuana coming from
the property.” (R., p.1762.)
As the district court put it, Mr. Beavers asserted “a witness, Elliott Briggs, could have
testified in a manner that would have discredited Paull’s testimony.” (R., p.1763.) The district
court ruled Mr. Beavers “has established that there is an issue of material fact regarding whether
[trial counsel’s] performance was deficient for failing to present an expert witness regarding the
smell of marijuana at the Franks hearing.” (R., pp.1763-64.) Thus, the district court denied the
State’s motion for summary dismissal with respect to that claim, but it summarily dismissed the
remaining claims in the petition. (R., p.1770.)
Mr. Beavers subsequently filed another motion for the appointment of post-conviction
counsel. (R., pp.1780-83.) The district court granted the motion. (R., pp.1902-06.)

7

The file stamps on the district court’s orders granting the motion for an extension of time, and
denying the motion to amend, reflect that the orders were lodged on October 9, 2014, and filed
on October 10, 2014. (R., pp.1640, 1643.)
6

The district court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Mr. Beavers’ ineffective assistance
of counsel claim over two days. (See generally Tr. Mar. 21 & 22, 2017 (hereinafter, Tr.), pp.7105.) The parties then filed written closing arguments. (R., pp.200-14.)
In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order (R., pp.215-27), the district court
found Mr. Beavers “testified at the evidentiary hearing. He reviewed photos from the day of his
arrest. He identified marijuana plants that were not flowing, which he stated do not emit a
sufficiently distinct odor to be detected as alleged in this case.” (R. p.218.) The district court
also found Mr. Beavers “testified the greenhouses at his residence were equipped with activated
charcoal filters and that fans were in continuous use up to the time of his arrest for the purpose of
exchanging air.” (R., p.218.)
The district court found Mr. Beavers, in the criminal case, had filed “affidavits in support
of the motion to suppress, for the purpose of expressing that it was improbable that anyone not
standing on the property could smell the odor of marijuana.” (R., p.218.) Mr. Beavers testified
he spoke with his first trial attorney about the need to hire an expert on identifying marijuana by
smell. (See R., p.218.) The first trial attorney contacted Mr. Briggs, but did not retain him as an
expert. (See R., p.219.) Mr. Beavers then fired the first trial attorney and hired trial counsel.
(See R., p.219.) The district court found Mr. Beavers testified he asked trial counsel “to retain
Chris Conrad, who Beavers believed was the leading expert regarding identifying marijuana by
smell. Beavers states that [trial counsel] claimed an expert was not needed and that he would
rely on cross-examination of the state’s expert.” (R., p.219.)
Mr. Briggs, a consultant in forensic toxicology, also testified at the evidentiary hearing.
(See R., p.219.) The district court found Mr. Briggs had reviewed the marijuana evidence, and
his report indicated the first bag of marijuana he observed had a characteristic marijuana odor

7

and recognizable marijuana buds inside. (R., p.219.) The district court also found Mr. Briggs
“confirmed he was not an expert with respect to the odor of marijuana.” (R., p.219.)
The district court described Mr. Conrad as a consultant “who has testified about
marijuana odor and has been an expert on marijuana cultivation.” (R., p.219.) The district court
found Mr. Conrad “testified that he believes an expert would have been helpful for purposes of
discrediting Detective Paull’s testimony at the suppression hearing.”

(R., pp.219-20.)

Mr. Conrad testified “if he had been hired he would have gone to the house and inspected both
the greenhouse and the home,” and his inspection would have allowed him to testify on the
filtration system and whether odor was ascertainable from neighboring property. (R., p.220.)
Mr. Conrad further testified that the odor of marijuana plants was dependent on the strain, and he
did not know what strain the plants in question were. (R., p.220.)
Trial counsel testified at the evidentiary hearing, and the district court found his strategy
during the Franks hearing “was to establish that the officer presented ‘false testimony’ to the
Court regarding utility records when he sought the search warrant of the home.” (R., p.220.)
Trial counsel had believed the magistrate relied on the utility records that were presented and the
officer’s testimony to find probable cause, and therefore his strategy “was to establish that the
officer testified falsely or recklessly regarding the utility records.” (R., pp.220-21.)
The district court found trial counsel was aware that Mr. Beavers “was adamant that the
officer could not have smelled green marijuana emanating from the residence.” (R., p.221.)
Trial counsel was aware of the unsigned affidavit prepared for Mr. Briggs and had tried to
contact him, but did not have anything indicating he made contact. (R., p.221.) The district
court then found that, “[a]t the time of this case,” trial counsel “was unaware of any cases where
reliance on the lack of odor of marijuana was sufficient to overturn probable cause.” (R., p.221.)

8

The district court found trial counsel “testified that he is unaware whether Briggs was an expert
regarding the odor of marijuana because he never spoke with him,” and “made no attempt to find
another expert, but he did not know any experts regarding odor at that time.” (R., p.221.)
The district court determined, “[t]he decisions made by [trial counsel] were sound
strategic decisions, based upon adequate preparation and knowledge of the law at that time.
Further, as noted above, even if [trial counsel] had presented Briggs as an expert witness, Briggs
testified at the hearing before this Court that he is not an expert with respect to the odor of
marijuana.” (R., p.225.)
The district court then determined, “even if the Petitioner had shown trial counsel was
ineffective, the record establishes that the Petitioner was not biased as a result of failing to
present an expert witness.”

(R., p.225.)

According to the district court, the trial court’s

memorandum decision explained that several factors were relied upon to issue the search warrant
based on the totality of the circumstances, including the neighbor’s testimony on the odor of
marijuana and a DEA informant’s tip. (R., p.225.) The district court determined, “the Petitioner
cannot establish the outcome of this case would have been different but for [trial counsel’s]
failure to present an expert on the odor of marijuana.” (R., p.225.)
Because the district court determined Mr. Beavers had not established deficient
performance or prejudice, the district court dismissed the remaining ineffective assistance of
counsel claim from his post-conviction petition. (R., p.225.) The district court dismissed all of
the claims in the petition with prejudice. (R., pp.225-26, 228-29.)
Mr. Beavers filed a Notice of Appeal timely from the district court’s Final Judgment and
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. (R., pp.230-37.)

9

ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed, without a twenty-day notice
period, Mr. Beavers’ claim that the prosecution withheld favorable information, because
the district court dismissed it on grounds independent from those raised by the State?

II.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Beavers’ motion to amend
the post-conviction petition, because the district court did not act consistently with the
applicable legal standards mandating that leave to amend should be freely given?

III.

Did the district court err when it dismissed, after an evidentiary hearing, the claim that
trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain an expert witness on detecting the smell
of marijuana, because Mr. Beavers established deficiency and prejudice?

10

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred When It Summarily Dismissed, Without A Twenty-Day Notice Period,
Mr. Beavers’ Claim That The Prosecution Withheld Favorable Information, Because The District
Court Dismissed It On Grounds Independent From Those Raised By The State

A.

Introduction
Mr. Beavers asserts the district court erred when it summarily dismissed, without a

twenty-day notice period, his claim that the prosecution withheld information favorable to him,
because the district court dismissed that claim on grounds independent from those raised by the
State in support of summary dismissal. The district court dismissed the claim after determining
Mr. Beavers had provided no evidence in support. (See R., p.1770 n.14.) But this reason for
summary dismissal was not raised by the State, and the district court failed to provide the
required twenty-day notice period before dismissing the claim.

Thus, the dismissal of the

withholding favorable information claim should be vacated.

B.

Standard Of Review
“Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-

conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the trial court’s own initiative.”
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 444 (2008). The Idaho Supreme Court has held, “when
reviewing a district court’s order of summary dismissal in a post-conviction relief proceeding,
we apply the same standard as that applied by the district court. Thus, when reviewing such a
dismissal, this Court must determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists based on the
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file.” Ridgley v. State, 148
Idaho 671, 675 (2010) (citing Yakovac, 145 Idaho at 444).

11

C.

The District Court Dismissed The Withholding Favorable Information Claim On Grounds
Independent From Those Raised By The State, Without Providing Mr. Beavers The
Required Twenty-Day Notice Period
The district court dismissed the withholding favorable information claim on grounds

independent from those raised by the State in support of summary dismissal. The district court
did so without providing Mr. Beavers the required twenty-day notice period before dismissing
the claim.
Mr. Beavers did not make an objection on the above basis before the district court.
However, a post-conviction petitioner may assert, for the first time on appeal, that his or her
post-conviction claims were dismissed without any notice at all. Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,
522 (2010).
A district court may grant a motion for summary disposition of a post-conviction petition
“when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and
agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” I.C. § 19-4906(c).
The district court “cannot dismiss claims on its own motion if it does not give the parties a
twenty-day prior notice stating its reasons for doing so as required by Idaho Code § 19-4906(b).”
DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 602 (2009). “Likewise, if the State moves to dismiss a petition
under Idaho Code § 19-4906(c), the court cannot dismiss a claim on the ground not asserted by
the State in its motion unless the court gives the twenty-day notice required by Section 194906(b).” Id. (citing Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 322 (1995)).
Here, the district court did not give any notice of its reasons for dismissing the
withholding favorable information claim. Mr. Beavers asserted, in claim 7(z1) of the petition,
that “the prosecutor withheld information favorable to the defendant.” (R., pp.422-23.)

12

However, the State did not specifically address this assertion.

The State’s answer

contained a general denial of Mr. Beavers’ asserted grounds for relief, without specifically
addressing whether the prosecutor withheld favorable information. (See R., pp.540-41.) The
State’s briefs in support of summary dismissal also did not specifically address the claim. In the
first brief in support, the State synthesized Mr. Beavers’ ineffective assistance of counsel
assertions into ten claims, and individually listed the three claims of error by the district court.
(See R., pp.690-91.)

But the first brief did not even mention the withholding favorable

information claim, much less address its merits. (See R., pp.690-94.) As for the second brief in
support, it exclusively focused on Mr. Beavers’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The
second brief individually listed each of Mr. Beavers’ twenty-seven claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel (R., pp.730-32), before arguing “each of the allegations noted above fails to
raise a genuine issue of fact” (R., p.733). The second brief also did not mention or specifically
address the withholding favorable information claim. (See R., pp.726-33.)
In its summary dismissal order, the district court determined, “the Petitioner provided no
evidence supporting his allegation that the prosecutor withheld evidence favorable to the
defendant. Therefore claim 7(z4) [sic] is dismissed.” (R., p.1770 n.14.) Because the State never
specifically addressed the withholding favorable information claim, this was a reason for
dismissing the claim entirely independent from the grounds for which Mr. Beavers had notice
from the State’s motions for summary dismissal and briefs in support. Thus, the district court
was required to provide Mr. Beavers with a twenty-day notice period under section 19-4906(b).
See DeRushé, 146 Idaho at 602.
This is not a case like Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517 (2010), where the Idaho Supreme
Court ultimately held that because the district court based its dismissal of the petitioner’s post-

13

conviction claims, at least partially, on the grounds raised by the State in its motion for summary
dismissal and supporting memorandum, the petitioner was not entitled to a twenty-day notice
period.

Cf. Kelly, 149 Idaho at 522-23. In Kelly, the State’s motion asked for summary

dismissal on the ground the petitioner “has no evidentiary basis to support his claims.” Id. at
523. The district court in Kelly concluded its analysis by holding that the petition failed because
the petitioner’s affidavits “do not contain admissible facts to support his allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel.” Id. On appeal, the Kelly Court held, “it is clear that the
district court’s dismissal of Kelly’s application for post-conviction relief was based at least
partially on the grounds that the State argued.” Id.
Conversely, in this case the State did not ask for summary dismissal based on a general
argument that all of Mr. Beavers’ claims should be dismissed for lack of supporting evidence.
Rather, the first brief in support specifically argued the claims of error by the district court
should be dismissed because they could have been brought on direct appeal. (See R., p.692.) As
for Mr. Beavers’ “remaining claims,” the first brief argued they “all claim ineffective assistance
of counsel” (see R., p.692), and suggested Mr. Beavers had not provided admissible evidence or
shown prejudice for those claims (see R., pp.693-94). The second brief in support focused
exclusively on the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, and contended those claims failed to
raise a genuine issue of fact. (See R., p.733.) Thus, unlike Kelly, the State in the instant case
never made a general argument that all of Mr. Beavers’ claims should be dismissed for lack of
supporting evidence. Cf. Kelly, 149 Idaho at 523. It cannot be said that the district court here
based its dismissal of the withholding favorable information claim, even partially, on the grounds
raised by the State.
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Because the district court did not give any notice of its reasons for dismissing the
withholding favorable information claim, the summary dismissal of the claim must be vacated.
See Garza v. State, 139 Idaho 533 (2003), abrogated on other grounds by Verska v. St.
Alphonsus Reg’l Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889 (2011).

II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Beavers’ Motion To Amend The
Post-Conviction Petition, Because The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The
Applicable Legal Standards Mandating That Leave To Amend Should Be Freely Given

A.

Introduction
Mr. Beavers asserts the district court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to

amend the post-conviction petition, because it did not act consistently with the applicable legal
standards. The district court denied the motion to amend after determining “that the State will be
unduly prejudiced if the motion were granted due to the late nature of the request and the short
timeframe before argument is scheduled.” (R., pp.1645-46.) However, the district court’s
references to the timing of the motion do not explain why the State would be unduly prejudiced,
in light of the surrounding circumstances. Thus, the district court did not act consistently with
the applicable standards, which mandate leave to amend should be freely given.

B.

Standard Of Review
An application for post-conviction relief is in the nature of a civil proceeding, entirely

distinct from the underlying criminal action, and the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure generally
apply. Windom v. State, 162 Idaho 417, ___, 398 P.3d 150, 154 (2017). The Idaho Supreme
Court has held, “[t]he denial of a plaintiff’s motion to amend a compliant to add another cause of
action is governed by an abuse of discretion standard of review.” Id., 398 P.3d at 154 (quoting
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Thomas v. Med. Ctr. Physicians, P.A., 138 Idaho 200, 210 (2002)). When reviewing an exercise
of discretion, an appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry into whether the district court
(1) rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion, (2) acted within the outer boundaries of such
discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices, and
(3) reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989).

C.

The District Court Did Not Act Consistently With The Applicable Legal Standards When
It Denied Mr. Beavers’ Motion To Amend
Mr. Beavers asserts the district court did not act consistently with the applicable legal

standards when it denied his motion to amend. Under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, once a
responsive pleading is filed, generally “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing
party’s written consent or the court’s leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so
requires.” I.R.C.P. 15(a). “The dual purposes of Rule 15(a) are to allow claims to be determined
on the merits rather than technicalities and to make pleadings serve the limited role of providing
notice of the nature of the claim and the facts that are at issue.” Thomas, 138 Idaho at 210.
Motions for leave to amend pleadings are to be liberally granted under I.R.C.P. 15(a).
Estate of Becker v. Callahan, 140 Idaho 522, 528 (2004). The Idaho Supreme Court has held
that “[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason—such as undue delay, bad faith or
dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendment
previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of the
amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the leave sought should, as the rules require, be freely
given.” Carl H. Christensen Family Trust v. Christensen, 133 Idaho 866, 871 (1999) (quoting
Smith v. Great Basin Grain Co., 98 Idaho 266, 272 (1977)).
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Here, the district court did not act consistently with the above applicable standards when
it denied Mr. Beavers’ motion to amend the post-conviction petition. The district court denied
the motion to amend after determining “that the State will be unduly prejudiced if the motion
were granted due to the late nature of the request and the short timeframe before argument is
scheduled.” (R., pp.1645-46.) But the district court’s references to the timing of the motion do
not explain why the State would be unduly prejudiced, in light of the surrounding circumstances,
including the district court’s grants of additional time for Mr. Beavers to file a response to the
State’s motion for summary dismissal.
Although the motion for summary dismissal had been pending for over a year,
Mr. Beavers filed the motion to amend some two months before the scheduled oral argument on
the motion for summary dismissal. (See R., pp.1515, 1540.) Further, the district court denied
the motion to amend well over a month before the scheduled oral argument. (See R., p.1643.)
The State also did not file an objection to the motion to amend, as the district court noted. (See
R., p.1643 n.1.) And perhaps most importantly, the district court granted Mr. Beavers additional
time to file a response to the motions for summary dismissal, including on the very same day it
denied his motion to amend. (See R., pp.1640, 1703.)
In brief, the surrounding circumstances do not show the State would be unduly
prejudiced, especially considering the district court continued to postpone the deadline for
Mr. Beavers to file a response to the motions for summary dismissal. Thus, the district court’s
references to the timing of the motion to amend do not explain why the State would be unduly
prejudiced if leave to amend were granted. Thus, the district court did not act consistently with
the applicable standards, which mandate leave to amend should be freely given. See Christensen
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Family Trust, 133 Idaho at 871. Because the district court thereby abused its discretion, the
denial of Mr. Beavers’ motion to amend the petition must be vacated. See id. at 874.

III.
The District Court Erred When It Dismissed, After An Evidentiary Hearing, The Claim That
Trial Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To Retain An Expert Witness On Detecting The Smell
Of Marijuana, Because Mr. Beavers Established Deficiency And Prejudice

A.

Introduction
Mr. Beavers asserts the district court erred when it dismissed, after an evidentiary

hearing, his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain an expert witness on the
probability of whether Detective Paull, at the time he claimed to smell marijuana, was able to
detect the smell of marijuana coming from Mr. Beavers’ property. The district court determined
Mr. Beavers had shown neither deficient performance nor prejudice. (See R., pp.224-25.) But
Mr. Beavers actually established trial counsel’s failure to retain an expert witness on detecting
the smell of marijuana was deficient performance, and this deficient performance prejudiced his
case. Thus, the district court’s dismissal of this claim should be vacated.

B.

Standard Of Review
Upon review of a district court’s denial of a petition for post-conviction relief when an

evidentiary hearing has occurred, Idaho appellate courts will not disturb the district court’s
factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700 (1999)
(citing I.R.C.P. 52(a); Russell v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67 (Ct. App. 1990)). When reviewing
mixed questions of law and fact, the appellate court defers to the district court's factual findings
supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of the relevant law to those
facts. Id. (citing Young v. State, 115 Idaho 52, 54 (Ct. App. 1988)).
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C.

Trial Counsel’s Failure To Retain An Expert Witness On Detecting The Smell Of
Marijunana Was Deficient Performance, And That Deficient Performance Prejudiced
Mr. Beavers’ Case
Mr. Beavers asserts he established trial counsel’s failure to retain an expert on detecting

the smell of marijuana was deficient performance, and that deficient performance prejudiced his
case. As discussed above, a petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil, rather than
criminal, proceeding. State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 560 (2008). The Idaho Supreme Court has
held that, “[l]ike the plaintiff in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of
evidence the allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based.” Id. (citing
I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869 (1990)).
An appellate court reviews claims for ineffective assistance of counsel using the twoprong test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Payne, 146 Idaho at 561. “First,
a claimant must prove that counsel’s performance was deficient,” by showing that counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho
758, 760 (1988). “Second, a claimant must show that this deficient performance prejudiced his
or her case.” Id. The United States Supreme Court has defined prejudice as “a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
“When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court does not secondguess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for postconviction relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review.” Payne, 146
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Idaho at 561. “There is a strong presumption that counsel’s performance fell within the wide
range of professional assistance.” Id.

1.

Trial Counsel’s Failure To Retain An Expert Witness On Detecting The Smell Of
Marijuana Was Deficient Performance

Mr. Beavers asserts he established trial’s counsel failure to retain an expert witness on
detecting the smell of marijuana was deficient performance.

The district court found that

Mr. Briggs confirmed he was not an expert with respect to the odor of marijuana. (R., p.219.)
Thus, with respect to the deficiency prong, the district court determined that “Briggs could not
have provided expert testimony to rebut Paull’s testimony,” and even if trial counsel “had
presented Briggs as an expert witness, Briggs testified at the hearing before this Court that he is
not an expert with respect to the odor of marijuana.” (R., pp.224-25.)
However, the district court did not make a similar finding with respect to whether
Mr. Conrad could have provided expert testimony to rebut Detective Paull. The district court
found Mr. Beavers testified he asked trial counsel to retain Mr. Conrad. (R., p.219.) The district
court also found that, at the time of the criminal case, trial counsel “was unaware of any cases
where reliance on the lack of odor of marijuana was sufficient to overturn probable cause,” and
trial counsel “made no attempt to find another expert, but he did not know any experts regarding
odor at that time.” (R., p.221.) The district court did not make an express finding as to whether
or not Mr. Beavers asked trial counsel to retain Mr. Conrad. (See R., pp.219-21.)
The district court did find that Mr. Conrad testified he believed “an expert would have
been helpful for purposes of discrediting Detective Paull’s testimony at the suppression hearing.”
(See R., pp.219-20.) Specifically, Mr. Conrad testified an expert would be helpful on several
different points. (Tr., p.52, L.12.) He testified “the age of the plants is significant in terms of the
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odor of cannabis”; young plants “have a more generic plant odor,” while plants that are
flowering and producing resin “have the strong distinctive odor known to most law
enforcement.”

(Tr., p.52, Ls.12-18.)

Mr. Conrad also testified that, “in the area of the

ventilation and the filtration of air from the two greenhouses,” based on Mr. Beavers’ statements
and the limited help from the photos, he thought “that an expert would have been helpful in
arguing that there would have been little or no odor to come from those. Certainly not a strong
odor.” (Tr., p.52, L.19 – p.53, L.1.) Mr. Conrad additionally flagged “other issues that could
have come into play, such as wind direction and things like that, that we don’t have information
about.” (Tr., p.53, Ls.2-4.)
On cross-examination, Mr. Conrad stated he began testifying as an expert witness “after
California legalized marijuana in 1996.” (Tr., p.62, L.22 – p.63, L.7.) He testified that, although
he did not advertise or appear in any expert witness registries, “a lot of people seem to know
about me. Probably because of my books.” (Tr., p.63, Ls.11-15.) Mr. Conrad had also taught
CLEs in California and Washington. (Tr., p.63, L.22 – p.64, L.2.)
Mr. Conrad’s testimony indicates that, even if trial counsel subjectively did not know
about other experts on marijuana odor like Mr. Conrad, under an objective standard, trial counsel
should have known about such experts. Further, trial counsel should have sought to retain an
expert witness on detecting the smell of marijuana, because of the possibility the trial court
would find probable cause for the search warrant based on the marijuana odor. Trial counsel
testified he focused on discrediting Detective Paull through showing he presented false testimony
on the utility records, to the apparent exclusion of also challenging whether the officer could
have smelled the odor of marijuana coming from Mr. Beavers’ property. (See Tr., p.77, L.9 –
p.78, L.13.) Trial counsel testified that, even though he established “that the officer presented
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false testimony,” the trial court “found the smell alone was enough to justify issuance of the
warrant.” (Tr., p.78, Ls.9-13.)
Indeed, the trial court’s memorandum decision observed, “[a]lthough Idaho courts have
not answered the particular issue of whether odor alone is sufficient to justify a finding of
probable cause for issuance of a search warrant, many jurisdictions outside the state have.”
(R., p.668.) The trial court cited dicta from a United States Supreme Court case on how the odor
of a forbidden substance could justify issuance of a search warrant, as well as cases where the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had held the odor of marijuana alone was
sufficient to uphold a finding of probable cause to issue a search warrant. (R., p.669 (citing
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948); United States v. Kerr, 876 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir.
1989); United States v. Bragg, 7 Fed. Appx. 578 (9th Cir. 2001).)8 The trial court then found
Detective Paull’s testimony that he smelled marijuana “was true and accurate,” and, when
combined with the other evidence, supported probable cause for issuance of the search warrant.
(See R., pp.669-70.)
As Mr. Beavers asserted in his written closing argument, “[i]n the absence of a competing
expert witness for the defense, neither Detective Paull nor [the State’s forensic scientist expert
witness] were effectively cross-examined or challenged on their training and experience in
marijuana odor detection, the impact of operating activated charcoal air filtration systems on
Plaintiff’s property and the differences between species of marijuana . . . .” (See R., p.203.) This

8

Also, the memorandum in support of the motion to suppress, filed by Mr. Beavers’ first trial
attorney, discussed a California appellate case where officers had obtained a search warrant after
stating in an affidavit they could smell a strong odor of marijuana coming from the defendant’s
residence. (See R., pp.884-85 (citing People v. Benjamin, 77 Cal. App. 4th 264 (1999)).)

22

was especially important in light of the cases from other jurisdictions, which helped justify the
trial court’s finding probable cause based on the marijuana odor.
By not retaining an expert witness like Mr. Conrad on detecting the smell of marijuana,
trial counsel effectively ignored an important facet of the defense, and trial counsel’s
performance therefore fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Payne, 146 Idaho
at 563. Put otherwise, as Mr. Beavers asserted before the district court (see R., p.206), this
record evinces inadequate trial preparation on the part of trial counsel. See Payne, 146 Idaho at
563. Thus, the district court erred when it determined Mr. Beavers had not met his burden of
showing deficiency for this claim.

2.

Trial Counsel’s Deficient Performance In Failing To Retain An Expert Witness
On Detecting The Smell Of Marijuana Prejudiced Mr. Beavers’ Case

Mr. Beavers asserts he established trial counsel’s deficient performance in failing to
retain an expert witness on detecting the smell of marijuana prejudiced his case. The district
court determined that “even if the Petitioner had shown trial counsel was ineffective, the record
establishes that the Petitioner was not biased as a result of failing to present an expert witness.”
(See R., p.225.) The district court stated the trial court’s memorandum decision “explains that
several other factors were relied upon to determine that there was probable cause to issue the
search warrant based upon the totality of the circumstances,” including Detective Paull’s
testimony on the odor of marijuana, the neighbor’s testimony on the odor of marijuana, and the
DEA informant’s tip. (See R., p.225.)
However, the trial court memorandum decision also stated, “[i]t should be noted that the
Defendant did not call any expert witnesses on his behalf.” (R., p.667 n.1.) The trial court drew
a contrast between trial counsel’s failure to call any expert witnesses on behalf of Mr. Beavers,
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and the State calling a forensic scientist as an expert at the Franks hearing. (See R., p.667.)
According to the forensic scientist, the smell of marijuana is primarily produced from resin in the
plant, which is mainly found in the plaint’s buds, stem and leaves. (R., p.667.) The high
concentration of resin in the buds explains why the odor of marijuana is stronger when it is
budding. (R., p.667.) He testified “that it is possible to smell the odor of marijuana even when
the plant does not have buds, although the plant’s odor is usually stronger when budding.”
(R., p.667.) The forensic scientist “also testified that the odor of marijuana increases with the
age of the plant, so older or more mature plants have a stronger smell.” (R., p.667.)
The trial court stated, “there was no contrary evidence adduced at the Franks hearing to
support a finding that the officer had fabricated the story about the marijuana odor emanating
from the home to obtain a search warrant.” (R., p.667.) When the trial court ultimately found
“the Defendant did not meet his burden in showing by a preponderance of the evidence that
Officer Paull’s testimony that he smelled marijuana coming from Defendant’s residence was
false,” it relied upon the forensic scientist’s testimony that, “[c]ontrary to Defendant’s
contention . . . it was possible to smell the odor of marijuana emanating from non-budding
plants.” (R., p.668.) The trial court also reiterated, “there is no evidence in the record that
contradicts Officer Paull’s testimony.” (R., p.668.)
As the district court here found, Mr. Conrad “testified that if he had been hired he would
have gone to the house and inspected both the greenhouse and the house. Such inspection would
have allowed for him to testify with respect to the filtration system and whether odor was
ascertainable if standing at neighboring property.” (R., p.220.) Further, Mr. Conrad, in contrast
to the forensic scientist’s testimony, indicated “that young cannabis plants have a more generic
plant odor,” and that the compounds that give marijuana its distinct odor are only present in trace
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amounts when the plant is not flowering. (See Tr., p.52, L.12 – p.53, L.12.) Thus, if trial
counsel had retained Mr. Conrad, he could have provided testimony to rebut Detective Paull’s
and the State’s forensic scientist’s testimony on whether the smell of marijuana was detectable
coming from Mr. Beavers’ property.
In sum, the trial court emphasized in the memorandum decision that trial counsel did not
call an expert witness or provide evidence to contradict the testimony by Detective Paull and the
forensic scientist, and Mr. Conrad could have provided testimony to contradict the State’s
witnesses. Thus, there was a reasonable probability that the result of the suppression motion in
the underlying criminal case would have been different but for the second attorney’s deficient
performance. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. At the least, the interplay between the lack of
evidence actually presented by trial counsel, and Mr. Conrad’s potential testimony, suggests
there is a probability of a different result sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. See
id. The district court erred when it determined Mr. Beavers had not met his burden of showing
prejudice for this claim.
Because Mr. Beavers established trial counsel’s failure to retain an expert witness on
detecting the smell of marijuana was deficient performance, and this deficient performance
prejudiced his case, the district court’s dismissal of the claim should be vacated.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, Mr. Beavers respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district
court’s order summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief, on the claim that the
prosecution withheld favorable information, and remand the matter to the district court for
further proceedings on that claim.
Alternatively, Mr. Beavers respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s
order denying his motion to amend the post-conviction petition, vacate the order dismissing the
petition, and remand the matter to the district court for further proceedings on the motion
to amend.
Alternatively, Mr. Beavers respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s
order dismissing his petition, on the claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to retain
an expert witness on detecting the smell of marijuana, and remand the matter to the district court
for further proceedings on that claim.
DATED this 27th day of February, 2018.

___________/s/______________
BEN P. MCGREEVY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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